DISTINKTION: JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY
2024, VOL. 25, NO. 3, 361–385
https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.2023.2173268

Karl Marx's critique of the state as an alienation of society in his 1843 *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of State*

Mikkel Flohr

Department of Social Science and Business, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark

ABSTRACT

Alienation became a central but controversial concept in the reception and interpretation of Karl Marx's thought after the posthumous publication of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* in 1932. Numerous interlocutors debated the content and configuration of Marx's concept of alienation and its relationship to G.W.F. Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach, as well as his own subsequent critique of political economy. But these debates inadvertently ignored Marx's prior *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of State*. This article aims to remedy this omission. Through close textual analysis and theoretical recontextualization I reconstruct and reinterpret Marx's elaborate critique of the modern sovereign state as an *alienation* of civil society rooted in the dynamics of the modern system of private property, which also sheds new light on Marx's concept of alienation, its relationship to prior political philosophy, (post-)Hegelian philosophy and his subsequent critique of political economy.

KEYWORDS

Marx; alienation; Feuerbach; Hegel; sovereignty

Alienation was a pervasive and central topic of classical sociological theory. Emilé Durkheim introduced the concept of 'anomie,' meaning norm– or lawlessness, to describe the subjective experience of the norms guaranteeing social cohesion disintegrating as a result of the rapid social and economic changes associated with modern capitalist societies and the increasingly complex division of labour (Durkheim 2013, 277–91; see also Durkheim 2002, 201–239; 288). Max Weber later analysed the progressive rationalization and concomitant disenchantment [*Entzauberung*] of modern social life (2004, 13, 30; 1992: *passim*). Karl Marx provided perhaps the most extensive and incisive analysis of the alienation of social relations under capitalism, but it went largely unnoticed until the discovery and posthumous publication of the texts published as *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (written in 1844) in 1932.[1] In these manuscripts, Marx foregrounded the alienation of humankind's species-being, its labour and social relations under capitalism, drawing on the works of G.W.F. Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach (see Marx 1975e). The manuscript attracted much scholarly attention and controversy, becoming the subject of a large body of secondary literature debating Marx's concept of alienation and its relationship to Feuerbach and Hegel as well as Marx's subsequent 'mature' critique of political economy (e.g. Marcuse 1967, 273ff; Fromm 1961, 43–58; Mészáros

CONTACT Mikkel Flohr Mikkel.Flohr@gmail.com Department of Social Science and Business, Roskilde University, Universitetsvej 1, Roskilde 4000, Denmark

1970; Ollman 1971; McLellan 1971, 105–121; Petrović 2001, 11–16; Althusser 2003; 2005; Osborne 2005, 45–55; Sayers 2011; Musto 2015; 2021).[2]

However, the focus on the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* had the unfortunate effect of obscuring Marx's prior development and deployment of the concept of alienation in another unfinished manuscript that had been written a year prior in 1843, posthumously published under the title *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of State* (Marx 1975b; henceforth *Critique*) in 1927 and the concomitant 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction' (1975d; henceforth 'Introduction'), which he published in *Deutsch – Französische Jahrbucher* in 1844 as an introduction to an unrealized revision and publication of the former (Marx 1987, 262). Together these texts outline a highly original and largely overlooked theory of the modern, seemingly sovereign state as an *alienation* of society rooted in the socio-economic dynamics of the modern system of private property (capitalism),[3] which in many ways formed the starting point of Marx's subsequent critique of political economy (Marx 1975e, 280–281; 1987, 262).[4] The analysis of these texts sheds new light on Marx's use of the concept of alienation and clarifies its relationship to the thought of Hegel and Feuerbach, which has been the subject of much controversy in the secondary literature, as well as the connection to early modern natural law and social contract theory, which has thus far gone largely unnoticed in the secondary literature.[5] Moreover, my analysis indicates both the concept's and these different connections' relevance to the development of Marx's subsequent thought.[6]

Through close textual analysis and theoretical recontextualization, I show that these two texts were based on a critical engagement with Feuerbach's critique of religion that formed the basis of Marx's reconfiguration and application of his method of 'reformatory critique' to Hegel's representation of the modern state in his 1821 *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1991b; henceforth *Philosophy of Right*), which he identified as a paradigmatic summation of the tradition of 'political theology,' defined by the conceptualization of the state as a sovereign subject transcending and determining society. Marx deployed an (inverted and sublated) Hegelian conception of alienation, reinterpreted and – signified through its conceptual coincidence with the political philosophical vocabulary of subjection and alienation, to conceptualize the modern state's relationship to society.[7] On this basis Marx identified the seemingly sovereign state as an alienation of society in two closely entwined respects. First and foremost, he argued that it was the appearance of society's collective agency as a separate and alien entity, seemingly beyond its control. This alienation was based on a second form of alienation: the divisions within society occasioned by the system of private property upheld by the state, that divided it as competing individuals and members of antagonistic classes. These divisions rendered the members of society incapable of recognizing their collective agency in the state, which therefore appeared and functioned *as if* it were in fact sovereign.

The article is divided into four sections. The first outlines my interpretation of Marx' *Critique* and 'Introduction' as a reformatory critique of political theology, represented by Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, drawing on and developing Feuerbach's previous critique of religion. The second section outlines the conceptual history and semantic investments of the concept of 'alienation' at the time. The third section analyses Marx's use of the concept of alienation in his critique of political theology. I argue that it was deployed in an inverted Hegelian form that also drew on its prior deployment in natural law

and social contract theories. The final section follows the movement of Marx's argument in the manuscript from the alienation of the state towards the dynamics of civil society that underpin it, more specifically the individualized competition and class conflict occasioned by the modern system of private property.

1. Marx's critique of political theology

My interpretation of Marx's *Critique* departs from and develops the insights of recent research that has shown that this manuscript, which he composed in Kreuznach during the summer of 1843 and the 'Introduction' completed towards the end of the same year or beginning of the next, together constitute an incomplete and hitherto overlooked critique of political theology, which this section will be dedicated to outlining and which will form the foundation of my argument in the following sections (see Flohr 2021; Kouvelakis 2003, 289–290; Abensour 2011, 31–33; Breckman 1999, 63–4, 296, 301). In the notebooks that Marx compiled as part of his preparation for writing the *Critique*, he identified Hegel's political philosophy as an expression of 'political theology' and suggested that this would be the subject of his projected critique (Marx 1981, 181; see also Marx 1975b, 189, 89 (129, 32-3); Flohr 2021, 538–8).[8]

Political theology refers to the hegemonic understanding of the modern state as a sovereign and impersonal subject transcending and determining its various institutions and society.[9] This idea emerged from the transfer and transformation of the (Christian) theological conception of a transcendent and omnipotent God into modern political thought after the Reformation, where it was secularized and associated with the emerging absolutist state apparatuses in and as the notion of the sovereign state. This idea retained the theological (transcendent) conceptual structure of its forebear independently of its actual content, constituting a distinctly *political theology*. The idea of state sovereignty was initially formulated by Jean Bodin in his 1576 *Six Books of the Republic* and was further developed in the works of Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and many others (Flohr 2021, 548–551; Schmitt 2006, 36ff; Kantorowicz 1997; Brown 2014, 54, 58-59, 26; Elshtain 2008; Hudson 2008). The subject of Marx's *Critique* was G.W.F. Hegel's continuation and development of this political theological tradition in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1991b), where Hegel conceptualized the modern state as a sovereign subject transcending and determining the institutions of the state and society ('objective spirit').

Marx's critique of Hegel's political theology took the contemporary Young Hegelian critique of religion as its starting point, more specifically that of Ludwig Feuerbach, who in his 1841 *The Essence of Christianity* argued that 'the secret of theology is nothing else than anthropology' (Feuerbach 2008, 166). He proposed that religion was a projection of humanity's collective capacities and potential universality – its so-called 'species being' [*Gattungswesen*][10] – unto a separate and imaginary entity; God (Feuerbach 2008, 115–6). The problem was that humanity did not recognize itself in this 'abstraction,' which seemed to transcend and determine its existence. As such humanity was alienated from itself, its universality and collective capacity for self-determination by religion (Feuerbach 2008, 1). The task of philosophy was to overcome human self-alienation through the critique of religion (Feuerbach 2008, 52).

Feuerbach extended the scope of this task to include his own philosophical starting point, insisting that Hegel's philosophy was in fact '*the last place of refuge and the last rational support of theology*' (Feuerbach 2012b, 168; see also Feuerbach 2012c, 204–7). Hegel's notion of spirit that transcended and determined humanity's progress in the course of the historical actualization of its logical structure in the world ('the idea') was an abstraction and alienation of humankind's natural and material existence on par with religion, according to Feuerbach. He therefore proposed that Hegel's speculative philosophy had to be subjected to the method of inversion and sublation that he had previously applied to religion.[11] He dubbed this method 'reformatory critique' and presented it as the process of 'mak[ing] the *predicate* into the *subject* and thus […] we need only *invert* speculative philosophy and then have the unmasked, pure, bare truth' (Feuerbach 2012b, 157). Feuerbach's combination of subject and predicate in his description of this method indicates that 'subject' is not solely deployed in the traditional philosophical sense of subjectivity, which is typically paired with and opposed to 'object' or 'substance' (especially in the Hegelian tradition), but also figures in the logical sense, where it denotes the primary referent of a proposition and bearer of predicates. This implies a logical hierarchy where the subject is primary in relation to the predicate, which refers solely to an attribute or a quality that inheres in or derives from the former (that is to say, the subject). The logical subject of Hegel's speculative philosophy was of course spirit, whereas humanity was reduced to a mere predicate thereof; Feuerbach's reformatory critique of Hegel's speculative philosophy was designed to reveal humanity as its real logical subject.

If we consider Feuerbach's proto-materialism, it seems plausible that his use of 'subject' was also meant to implicitly invoke the etymological origins of this term in the Greek *hypokeimenon* [*ὑποχείμενον*] used by Aristotle to denote both the logical subject ('primary subject') and the material substratum of which something is made up – a connection that Marx explicated and deployed, drawing on Hegel's identification of subject and substance, in his materialist appropriation and development of Feuerbach's method of reformatory critique in *Critique*, where he argues that 'because Hegel starts not with an actual existent (*ὑποχείμενον*, subject) but with predicates of universal determination, and because a vehicle for these determinations must exist, the mystical idea becomes that vehicle' (Marx 1975b, 80 (25); Aristotle 1952, 191; Osborne et al. 2006, 16–18, 29-32; Flohr 2021, 544, 570n75).

The crux of Feuerbach's reformatory critique of Hegel's speculative philosophy was that humanity's natural and material existence was the logical subject while the idea of spirit (and/as God) was a predicate or derivate of it. Because Hegel's sublation of the seeming contradiction between thought and being had taken place solely within thought and ignored being, the real subject, his resolution remained 'within contradiction,' fundamentally incapable of resolving or escaping it (Feuerbach 2012b, 167). Feuerbach therefore conceived Hegel's philosophy as the highest expression of this alienation and concluded that it had been resolved by his (re-)inversion and sublation of it; a conclusion that would soon be challenged by Marx on the basis of Feuerbach's own insights and method.

Feuerbach's influence is evident throughout Marx's *Critique*. The primary line of argumentation that characterizes the entire manuscript consists in the application of the method of reformatory critique to initial part of section three on 'The state' of the

third division ('Ethical life') of Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*.[12] However, this does not mean that it is reducible to Feuerbach's influence as a number of authors have suggested (Althusser 2003, 244; Arthur 1987, 99). In 'Introduction' Marx clarifies the transition from Feuerbach's reformatory critique of religion towards his own critique of political theology:

> The foundation of irreligious criticism is: *The human being makes religion*, religion does not make the human being […] But *the human being* is no abstract being squatting outside the world. The human being is *the world of humankind*, state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is *an inverted consciousness of the world*, because they are an *inverted world* (Marx 1975d, 244 (170)).[13]

While Marx takes Feuerbach's conclusion that the human being makes religion as his point of departure, he also challenges his abstract conceptualization of this human being, insisting that it cannot simply be reduced to some ideal and abstract entity, rather, it must be understood as the product of a series of historically determinate social and political relations and institutions. Thus, claiming that the human being makes religion is the same as saying that it is these historical relations and institutions that make religion and that this inverted consciousness (religion) must be understood and criticized in terms of the inversion of this world rather than the next, the world of humankind. The reformatory critique of religion, in other words, can only be completed insofar as it turns to the inverted world of humankind – otherwise it remains incomplete and forever confined to the realm of theology (Marx 1975d, 244–5 (170-171)).[14] Marx's presents religion in terms of a relationship between human beings and God, which corresponds to his presentation of the world of humankind as consisting of the state and (civil) society in the above quote.[15] It is possible to conceive the world of humankind in an analogous manner, i.e. in terms of an inverted relationship between the state and (civil) society (corresponding to the inverted relation between God and the human being); an interpretation that is supported by the text of the *Critique* (Marx 1975d; Flohr 2021, 545–47).[16]

The specific importance of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* to the critique of the world of humankind becomes apparent when considering Marx's characterization of this work as an expression of 'political theology' (Marx 1981, 181). In the passage from the 'Introduction' examined previously, theology figured not just as an inverted consciousness of the world, but '*an inverted consciousness of* […] *an inverted world*.' This inverted consciousness is thus parallel to and reflects the inversion in the world of humankind. This implies that when theology turns to the world of humankind, as with Hegel's political theology, it is able to provide an accurate, that is to say non-inverted, account of the inversion of this world, and for this reason Hegel's political theology provided the logical point of departure for Marx's reformatory critique of the inverted world of humankind. *Philosophy of Right* provided a precise (albeit uncritical) reconstruction of the contradiction of the modern world of man. The aim of Marx's *Critique* was to provide a critical perspective on the origin, dynamic and resolution of this contradiction through a reformatory critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.

Marx's critique of Hegel's political theology generally follows the pattern of Feuerbach's reformatory critique of religion: it is not God who is the logical and practical subject, but humankind and/as a natural being. The parallels in Hegel's *Philosophy of*

Right are readily available: here the state is identified as the objective realization of spirit, while civil society figures as an almost literal parallel to Feuerbach's natural being by virtue of Hegel and Marx's invocations of the Hobbesian state of nature to describe its inherent competition and conflict. Although it is important to note that civil society does not in any way refer to an original or natural condition; *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* appears here in the specifically modern sense of bourgeois or capitalist society (Hegel 1991b, 329 (§ 289); Marx 1975b, 101 (45); Hobbes 1994, 75, 78; Flohr 2021, 550–1).

According to Marx, the human being must be understood as a social and material being that exists primarily in civil society, which, after his inversion of Hegel's political philosophy, also comes to figure as the real subject, while the state is reduced to its predicate. The purportedly sovereign state only exists in and as the participation and obedience of the members of civil society in its various institutions. Marx therefore argues that Hegel's notion of the state as a sovereign subject transcending and determining civil society is an *abstraction*, the illusion of a separation of the sovereign state from its social foundation. But this does not mean that it is mere appearance or arbitrary ideology: insofar as the members of civil society proceed to act in accordance with this appearance, participating in and obeying the seemingly sovereign state, they give this abstraction a practical and material existence, that allows it to continue to appear and even function as if it was actually a separate and sovereign entity. Marx describes this as an 'existing falsehood' and 'the idea of a *separation that actually exists*' (Marx 1975b, 80, 146 (30, 89)).

The sovereign state is the separation of civil society from its own collective agency, which allows it to appear and function *as if* it was a sovereign subject and civil society merely its predicate. The world of humankind is, as Marx insisted, an inverted world, where the state exercises sovereign authority over society (as long as society continues to partake). Hegel's political philosophy was not accidentally inverted; it reflected the very real inversion in the world of humankind, that is, the practical and material inversion of subject and predicate; society and state, which was summarized in and as the doctrine of state sovereignty (Marx 1975b, 127, 177 (68, 118)). But the configuration of Hegel's dialectic suggests that the split is not between subject and substance (inverted or not) but is in fact internal to the subject: the abstraction of the seemingly sovereign state is the alienation of society from itself. As Marx explains:

> The political state in its transcendent remoteness […] is [the] affirmation of their own alienation [*Entfremdung*]. Hitherto the *political constitution* has always functioned as the *religious sphere,* the *religion* of the life of the people, the heaven of its universality as opposed to the *earthly existence* of its actual reality (Marx, 1975: 89 (33)).

Here it is important to note that Marx's use of the term 'political constitution' is derived from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, where it denotes the structure and organization of the modern state (rather than a fundamental legal document). To fully grasp the significance and implications of Marx's identification of the modern state as the alienation of the people, it is necessary to examine this concept in more detail.

2. On the concept(s) of alienation

The concept of 'alienation' is the standard translation of a number of related German terms that were particularly prominent in (post-)Hegelian philosophy, including

Entfremdung, *Entäusserung* and *Vergegenständlichung*. While these terms are distinct and have somewhat divergent connotations, they were used more or less interchangeably in this philosophical context to describe interrelated elements of a single conceptual and philosophical figure. The first term, *Entfremdung*, literally means 'to make alien' or 'to estrange' and is derived from *fremd* meaning 'alien' or 'strange.' The term *Entäusserung* (and the closely connected *Veräusserung*) is derived from *ausser* and denotes the act of 'making outer, outside or external' and is thus occasionally also rendered as 'externalization' in English and is closely connected to *Vergegenständlichung* meaning 'to make into an object' or 'objectification' insofar as something is immediately outside of and opposed to the subject. The terms *Trennung*, meaning separation or divorce, and *Spaltung*, meaning division or rupture, were also occasionally employed in a similar capacity but remained far less prominent than the aforementioned. While the terms deployed by Marx in his analysis and critique of the modern 'sovereign' state are distinct and have somewhat divergent connotations, their contemporaneous use and etymological origin suggests that they both can and should be treated as a single coherent conceptual figure irreducible to a single locution (Leopold 2007, 67–8: Mészáros 1970, 67–9, 73). For the sake of consistency these concepts will generally be rendered 'alienation' in the following – and occasionally 'objectification' when I wish to address this particular dimension – specifying the German wherever relevant.

According to György Lukács, the two most central German terms *Entaüsserung* and *Entfremdung* rendered into English as 'alienation' share a common etymological origin as German translations of precisely this English term. The English term 'alienation,' in addition to the immediate meaning of rendering something alien, also denoted the sale or transfer of private property in law and political economy and, more importantly for my present purposes, the surrender of (natural) liberty to found the sovereign power of the state in early modern natural law and social contract theories. The immediate and (political) economic meanings remained vested in the German terms (mainly *Entäusserung*) whereas its political philosophical connotations gradually diminished over time, while the primary meaning remained the transfer of something and/as a separation that renders it external and alien (Lukács 1975, 538–539; see also Osborne 2005, 45–50; Schacht 2015, 8–13; Petrović 2001, 11–12).[17] Nathan Rotenstreich and Richard Schacht trace the concept's origins even further back to the classical Latin *alienatio*, referring to the transfer of property, and the latter suggests that the political philosophical meaning of the term, was derived from Hugo Grotius' famous argument that natural liberty could be alienated in a manner analogous to property in order to institute the sovereignty of the state (Rotenstreich 1965, 145; Schacht 2015, 2, 8; Grotius 2005, 259–61).

Both authors also insist on the more general use of the Latin term to denote a separation, rendering something external and/or alien and highlight the related Latin notion of *alienatio mentis*, denoting the loss of one's mental faculties and/as a separation from one's soul, the connotations of which carried on in the subsequent English use of the term alienation (Rotenstreich 1965, 145; Schacht 2015, 2). Moreover, Rotenstreich connects this to the Greek concept of *ekstasis* [ἔκστασις], referring to the contemplative transcendence of oneself to overcome the division between knower and known (subject and object) and/or attain unity with God that he traces through ancient Greek philosophy and early Christian theology and argues that Hegel adapted and transformed

this figure as the foundation of his philosophy (Rotenstreich 1965, 144–155).[18] More recently, Catherine Malabou has highlighted Martin Luther's use of the term *Entäusserung* to translate the Greek '*kenosis*' [κένωσις] in Paul's description of the divine incarnation in the Epistle to the Phillipians (2:7). The Greek term denotes God's self-emptying as an 'exteriorization' or (messianic) incarnation in and of his creation, which, she argues, was the model of spirit's historical objectification and alienation as substance in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Malabou 2005, 82; but see also Schacht 2015, 7-8).

Although Hegel trained at the Protestant seminary in Tübingen, it is unclear to what extent he was influenced by these prior theological deployments of the term. Lukács is helpful in this regard, while insisting that alienation (especially *Entäusserung*) constitutes *the* central theme of Hegel's *Phenomenology* – if not his entire philosophy – he proposes that it was used in a relatively straightforward manner to refer to the process of rendering something external and/or alien, more precisely, the subject's (spirit) initial self-externalization or – objectification in and as substance. Hegel's subject does not immediately recognize itself in the otherness of the objective world, which instead appears to stand opposed to it and determine it.[19] The subject is thereby alienated from it and thus also from itself. But through the successive historical forms of consciousness and their (determinate) negation, outlined in *Phenomenology*, the subject gradually learns to recognize itself in its objectifications (first, in nature and then in society), overcoming the phenomenal separation between subject and substance and reconciling them in the differentiated totality of absolute spirit (Lukács 1975: 539, 541-2; Hegel 1977).[20] In this context, alienation must be understood to refer to both the initial process of self-externalization/-objectification *and* the immediate experience of estrangement from the results of the process, which simultaneously points towards their reconciliation in and as absolute spirit.

The Young Hegelians subsequently redeployed Hegel's concept of alienation in their critique of religion. They conceived the figure of a transcendent and omnipotent God as an externalization and separation of humanity from its own collective capacities and potential and attempted to overcome this alienation by revealing its hidden truth (humanity). This would allow humanity to recognize itself and actualize the alienated potential previously vested in God. While most of the Young Hegelians conceived their ideas as more or less consistent elaborations of Hegel's philosophy (based on the idea of an esoteric atheist core, e.g. Bauer 1989; *pace* Marx 1975a, 84), Feuerbach went further and criticized Hegel's speculative philosophy as another form of theology insofar as it likewise inverted the relationship between subject and predicate; logic and nature (including, first and foremost, humanity), as I have already outlined. This inverted configuration alienated humanity from its natural and material existence and had to be reinverted in order to reveal and recover its alienated content. This (inconsistent) proto-materialist critique of Hegel's philosophy in turn provided the basic impetus and conceptual resources of Marx's materialist critique of political theology and/as the critique of the idea of the sovereign state as represented by Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* as an alienation/objectification of society.

Marx's use of the concept of alienation in *Critique* is in many ways analogous to Hegel's, albeit in an inverted and sublated materialist form. This causes some conceptual displacements in its use insofar as the initial (Hegelian) formulation of alienation took place within the epistemological and conceptual framework of his absolute idealism,

starting from the subject (spirit) and its self-objectification in and as substance (alienation). Feuerbach initially inverted this. He argued that Hegel's (speculative) philosophy (conceived as a form of theology) was an alienation of the objective and natural existence of humanity (Feuerbach 2012b, 209). The concept of alienation was thereby reconfigured (but not reconceptualised) as the alienation of substance in the (appearance of a transcendent/theological) subject (spirit), displacing this particular configuration of alienation's association with objectification (which he nonetheless retained). Simultaneously, Feuerbach also conceived this re-inversion of subject and substance in terms of subject and predicate (as logical concepts), thereby compounding the conceptual confusion by implicitly identifying substance (mankind's natural and material existence) as the (logical) subject, while Hegel's subject (spirit) was identified as its (logical) predicate as well as an alienation of the real subject. Feuerbach's reformatory critique was the starting point and model of Marx's (more consistently materialist) inversion and sublation of Hegel's political theology, which therefore displays a similar conceptual displacement whereby the logical and grammatical subject is identified with the supposedly sovereign state's material substratum, i.e. society, which is objectified and alienated in this state. Marx overcomes this inherited conceptual confusion by identifying the sovereign and transcendent subject of Hegel's political theology with 'spirit' and 'the Idea' (in addition to 'state,' obviously) rather than 'subject,' which he primarily uses in the logical sense referring to society in relation to the aforementioned predicates as well as in relation to objectification in a conceptually unreformed Hegelian manner.

The (inverted) Hegelian vocabulary and these displacements afford two novel conceptual possibilities in the context of political philosophy, which Marx explores to great effect in the course of his argument and which I will outline in more detail in the following. First of all, the conceptual coincidence of the logical (and historical) *subject* of society and the (political) *subjects* of the sovereign state highlight the subjects' collective agency as the logical subject and material basis of the state, which in turn comes to figure as an objectification and alienation of the subjects. Secondly, the conceptualization of the sovereign state as an alienation of the subject (society) coincides with the conceptual figure of the social contract (and its historical antecedents) in early modern natural law and social contract theory that supposedly founds and maintains the sovereign state and implicitly highlights its popular foundation.

3. Alienation and objectification in *Critique*

Marx's *Critique* took Feuerbach's critique of religion as the point of departure for a critique of the world of humankind, as he illustrated in his summarization of the task at hand: 'It is the immediate *task of philosophy* […] to unmask estrangement [*Selbstentfremdung*] in its *unholy forms* once the *holy form* of human self-estrangement has been unmasked. Thus, the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of earth […] and the *criticism of theology* into the *criticism of politics*' (Marx 1975d, 244–245 (171)). Turning the criticism of religion into the criticism of politics entailed applying the method of reformatory critique to the unholy form of human self-estrangement in the modern state's seeming sovereign authority over society. In this context, Marx defines state sovereignty as the objectification [*Vergegenständlichung*] of its subjects: 'sovereignty, the essence of the state, is […] nothing but the objectified spirit of the subjects

of the state' (Marx 1975b, 80 (25)). This definition of sovereignty relies on Hegel's identification of subject and object, albeit in an inverted form, whereby Hegel's subject, i.e. spirit in the guise of the supposedly sovereign state, is replaced by its subjects, that is, society (re-)conceived as the logical (and material) subject that objectifies itself in the sovereign state, which must consequently be reconceived as a predicate of it.[21] In this definition, Marx also invokes the terminological coincidence between this logical and grammatical concept of subject that denotes primacy and agency (as well as material foundation) and the traditional political philosophical conception of (temporal) society and its members as *subjects* of the sovereign state.[22] In the latter context, 'subject(s)' denotes the subjection or subordination of the members of society to the sovereign power of the state. Marx's reformatory critique of political theology also extends to this conception, suggesting that the subjects together make up the real logical and material subject of this relationship in the sense of being the primary and active agent whose collective participation and obedience constitutes the supposedly sovereign state.

The sovereignty of the state is constituted and continuously reproduced by the collective participation and obedience of its subjects to its various institutions, yet it appears to them as an independent subject with sovereign power over them, which they have to submit to. To the extent that this impels them to continue to partake in and submit to it, its institutions can continue to appear and function as if they actually constituted a separate and sovereign subject. The appearance of civil society's collective agency as an external entity is the result of its divisions occasioned by private property, which splits it into individuals and classes and entails that its members are incapable of recognizing themselves as a collectivity and their collective agency in and as the state. This is further supported by the predominance of political theological doctrine and ideas that affirm this immediate appearance as the truth of the state – thereby reproducing the functional fiction of the sovereign state.

The supposedly sovereign state is created and maintained through the continuous and collective (alienated) participation of society. As such, the political theological notion of sovereign power is an illusion; power always already resides with those that appear to be subjected to it. The reason that the members of society continue to partake in the constitution and perpetuation of sovereign power, which denies their capacity for deliberate collective self-determination, is not necessarily that they support it. Rather, it is because they do not recognize that it is premised on their collective participation in it, since they are divided as competing individuals and conflicting classes by the dynamics of civil society. They therefore perceive the seeming sovereign state and its absolute power over them as an objective and unchangeable condition of their lives. They do not recognize their collective ability to change this situation and instead submit to and partake in it out of seeming necessity, thus, becoming part of the objectifying social dynamic (alienation) that constitutes the state as a seemingly transcendent subject with sovereign power over them.

Sovereignty is an illusion; it is the illusion of the state holding objective and absolute power over its subjects, entirely separate (alienated) from and independently of them. However, it is an illusion that is rooted in precisely what it conceals, more specifically, its subjects' collective participation and agency. The existence and perpetuation of this illusion presupposes the continuous reproduction of civil society as a system of private

property that divides society against itself as individuals and classes. This division is guaranteed by the modern state's central and constitutive role in the maintenance and protection of property relations and/as the class relations of civil society. While this is not a conscious strategy to reproduce the state (on behalf of the various individuals and institutions that together make up the political state) but a historical and largely opaque dynamic, it nonetheless constitutes a fundamental part of the modern state's reproduction. The concomitant predominance of political theological ideas in popular and scientific discourse ensures that the presence and intervention of the political state's various institutions and members, are consistently identified as the actions of a separate sovereign power. The theoretical privilege attributed to sovereign power in political theology contributes to this existing state of heteronomy (alongside its material foundation in the economic divisions of civil society and the institutions of the political state) insofar as it conceals the 'subjective' origins of sovereign power representing the state as a coherent and sovereign actor, thereby contributing to its perpetuation. Marx's reformatory critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* must be understood in this context; as an intervention intended to expose the vacuity of political theology, the practical powerlessness of the seemingly sovereign state and reveal its foundation amongst its subjects, thereby facilitating the possibility of change (without ever denying its immediate efficacy).

It is the appearance and (political theological) representation of society separated from its own collective agency in and as the state which Marx refers to in his definition of the sovereign state as an *objectification* of the subjects. His use of this concept draws on its deployment in Hegel's *Phenomenology*: the sovereign state appears to stand outside and opposed to society, reconceived as the logical and material subject by virtue of Marx's reformatory critique, in precisely the same way that the object confronted the subject of the *Phenomenology* as something outside of and opposed to it. For Hegel, this referred to the process of spirit's (self-)actualization in and as the world; a process that also involved an experience of negativity or alienation for finite consciousness because it only knew itself in and through its relation to the object, and it therefore experienced the otherness of the object as a loss of itself. However, Hegel argued that this negativity or alienation was a particular moment in consciousness' historical development towards the recognition that it is itself constitutive of the seeming objectivity or otherness of the object, which Hegel held was merely the phenomenal 'objective' expression of its own subjectness.[23]

Marx's use of the concept of alienation has the same logical structure as Hegel's dialectic but profoundly changes its meaning and significance by implicitly bringing it into contact with the concept's prior use in the modern natural law and social contract theory (which coincides with the emergence of political theological doctrine).[24] Grotius was the first to introduce the concept of alienation in modern political thought, drawing on Roman legal sources. He deployed the concept in his effort to provide political power with a secular foundation in natural law, which was conceived in terms of a community of individuals' pseudo-historical agreement to alienate their natural liberty to constitute a sovereign power over them that could guarantee order and stability (Grotius 2005, 259–62, 162-3, 338-42, 93; Grotius 2006, 33–40, 44-5; Schacht 2015, 8–9: Macpherson 2011, 3f).[25] Grotius' argument displaced preceding theological justifications of political power and provided a secular alternative that both anticipated and inspired subsequent social contract theories. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, conceived the covenant that

founded the sovereign state in terms of a multitude of individuals voluntarily 'renouncing' and 'transferring' their natural rights (with the exception of self-defence) through a covenant establishing the sovereign state, and while Rousseau objected to Grotius' conception of a people alienating its freedom to a government, he also based his argument on the notion of a social contract between individuals establishing the general will as a sovereign subject; a social contract that explicitly involved 'the total alienation of each associate, together with all of his rights, to the entire community' and insisted that this 'alienation is made without reservation' (Hobbes 1994, 81–2, 109; Rousseau 1987, 148, see also 144-5, 147-149).[26]

Grotius, Hobbes and Rousseau in various ways conceived sovereign power as founded on the people's voluntary alienation of their natural liberty, although this was consistently consigned to a mythical past and the people subsequently subsumed and subjected to the sovereign power of the state within the political theological structure of transcendence, effacing their political significance permanently. These writers, nonetheless, implicitly relied on the alienation of society as the foundation of the sovereign state; an argument which Marx would fundamentally reconfigure by combining it with the terminologically identical Hegelian motif of alienation, in order to show that society was the (implicitly) universal subject, alienated from itself in the form of the sovereign state and, moreover, argue that this alienation both could and should be overcome.[27] Marx's definition of sovereignty, thus, relies on the terminological intersection of the Hegelian philosophical thematic of alienation and prior political philosophical vocabulary to highlight the foundation of the state in the alienation of its subjects, who may appear to be subordinated to it but in fact constitute both its social and material basis as well as the possibility of overcoming it.

Hegel rejected both the natural law tradition's notion of an originary natural liberty and social contract theories' account of the popular foundation of the sovereign state on precisely these grounds, arguing that attributing mundane or popular origins to the state 'destroy[ed] the divine [element] which has being in and for itself and its absolute authority and majesty' (Hegel 1991b, 276–7 (§ 258); see also 316-21, 105-6, 126 (§§ 279, 75, 100)). He argued that the sovereign state should instead be conceived in terms of spirit's self-actualization in and through the people (Hegel 1991b, 285–6) (§§ 262-3). However, Hegel's political theology retained many of the same figures, invoking a 'state of nature' defined by individual freedom and conflicting interest. But rather than consigning this to some mythical past, Hegel identified it with civil society, which he argued was created and maintained by the modern state and the state of nature thus retained a paradoxical presence alongside the state within a hierarchical structure of transcendence that rendered the pseudo-historical social contract redundant and replaced it with a permanent and inescapable alienation (Hegel 1991b, 329 (§ 289); Marx 1975b, 101 (45); Hobbes 1994, 75, 78).

If Marx's argument followed the (idealist) dialectical structure of Hegel's argument then this immediate recognition of the state as an objectification of society's collective agency would be sufficient to reconcile and overcome the contradiction between them; by revealing to the subject that the seeming exteriority and opposition of the object is in fact nothing but its own reflection.[28] However, this depends on Hegel's assumption that reason has already been achieved in the world of humankind and that no social and political change is therefore required. A particularly poignant example can be

found in the preface to *Philosophy of Right*, where Hegel insisted that he was merely trying to reconcile consciousness with the actuality of the modern state, abstracting from its empirical imperfections in order to present it in essence 'as an inherently rational entity' (Hegel 1991b, 21–2). Marx argued that this efficiently reduced Hegel's political philosophy to a 'philosophical stamp of approval' whereby 'empirical reality is accepted as it is; it is even declared to be rational' (Marx 1995a, 99, 63 (43, 9)). Thus, even while Hegel implicitly conceded the persistence of material contradictions in modern society, he contended himself with abstracting from them in order to attain a purely philosophical reconciliation. The invocation of the political deployment of the concept of alienation emphasizes (contra Hegel) that it is not simply a feeling of estrangement from the world that can be overcome through the recognition and acceptance of the status quo as rational. Rather, it reveals the persistence of material contradictions and alienation in the world of humankind, which can only be overcome practically. Marx's argument thus points beyond recognition and reconciliation towards a fundamental revolutionary reconfiguration of the world of humankind (see also Flohr 2021, 547, 562).

Marx argues that the sovereign state is an alienation of society. However, this does not mean that it is an alienation of some pre-existing popular sovereignty. Sovereignty does not pre-exist alienation. In social contract theory, it is the alienation of the natural freedom of a given community in and through the social contract which constitutes the sovereign power of the state and must thus be conceived as the outcome and permanent form of this initial alienation. Sovereignty is not alienated from society, rather, it is the alienation of society. Marx's reformatory critique of political theology does not simply invert the political theological conception of the state as a sovereign subject transcending and determining society but sublates this configuration, inscribing both the state and society in a complex historical (temporal) continuum; the modern 'world of humankind,' which levels the structure of transcendence that defines political theology. Society is the logical and material subject and constitutes the foundation of the state (its predicate) but it cannot be said to be sovereign insofar as it remains subjected to and alienated in and as the modern state (and the system of private property, as I will show). This subjection is premised precisely on society's own (alienated) collective agency and (non-deliberate) participation in the state, which suggests that it has the potential to overcome this alienation and realize its collective agency in a democratic and deliberate form of self-determination beyond the modern 'sovereign' state-form, which he describes as 'true democracy' (Marx 1975b, 88 (32)).[29] However, insofar as this involves the abolishment of the state as a separate or alienated entity, it does not rely on a structure of transcendence or otherwise reiterate political theology's structure of transcendence in an inverted form.[30] By analogy with the critique of religion, which provided the starting point of Marx's critique of political theology, it is obvious that this does not aim to make humanity into a God in relation to God but simply aims to uncover and thereby allow humanity to understand and use its own hitherto alienated capacity for collective self-determination.[31]

4. The alienation of civil society

As I have already suggested, the structure of Hegel's dialectic suggests that alienation does not actually pertain to the relationship between subject and object as such but is

internal to the former; subject and object are entwined insofar as the object is merely the objectification of the subject. This corresponds to Marx's argument that the state is immanent to society and only exists in and of its collective enactment by its members. But this also suggests that it is necessary to look closer at the specific historical configuration of society that Marx is referring to, i.e. civil society in the sense of capitalism, which Marx suggests is characterized by the division of the members of society as individuals in constant economic competition and as structurally opposed classes based on private property. The early modern natural law tradition and social contract theory generally conceived the conflict and strife within society as the origin and occasion of society's alienation in and as the sovereign state (e.g. Hobbes' state of nature). Hegel rejected both the state of nature and the social contract. Yet his conceptualization of the relationship between the modern state and civil society relied on an analogous structure, wherein the competition and conflicts over private property in civil society split the people in individualized competition and class antagonisms, necessitating and legitimating the mediation of the sovereign state to overcome these divisions. Marx accepted the basic structure of this argument, but contended that the sovereign state, rather than overcoming the contradictions of civil society, formed a central and structurally integrated part of it (Hobbes 1994, 77; Hegel 1991b, 329 (§ 289); Marx 1975b, 101 (45); see also Macpherson 2011, 21–25).

In the detailed institutional analysis of the state structure outlined by Hegel that takes up the majority of Marx's unfinished manuscript, he shows how the particular interests of civil society are not and, indeed, cannot be mediated by the state and, in fact, permeate and shape the state's institutions at every level. Marx's analysis of the dynamics of civil society at this point remains rather rudimentary.[32] However, some of the basic elements of his subsequent critique of political economy are already anticipated. Yet, the terminology he employs is directly derived from Hegel and remains inadequate to the task of distinguishing between discrete elements in his analysis. As I have already shown, the concept of civil society is employed in two distinct, albeit closely related senses derived from the duality of the German *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* that can be rendered into English as both civil and bourgeois society. First and foremost, Marx uses the concept to refer to the emerging modern form of market society that is organized around the production, exchange and accumulation of private property, i.e. capitalism. This encompasses all of society and divides it through individualizing competition over private property. But later in the manuscript of *Critique*, Marx, following Hegel, begins to use civil society in a more restricted sense of bourgeois society, to refer specifically to the property-owning members of civil society (in the initial and broader sense) as distinct from and excluding the property-less 'class of […] concrete labour,' which he later, in 'Introduction' identified as 'the proletariat.' This is significant given Hegel's initial identification of the state with the explication and pursuit of the supposed universality of civil society, which then reveals itself as the one-sided (class) interest of civil society in this latter sense of the bourgeoisie in the perpetuation of the system of private property. The state's supposed universality and representation of civil society as a whole is thus revealed to conceal the particular class interest of the bourgeoise (Marx 1975b, 146–7 (89-90); 1975d: 255–257 (180-183)).[33]

Marx dedicated a substantial part of the manuscript to analysing how the interests of civil society (in the restricted sense of the bourgeoisie) differ based on their particular

trade, position and so on and continue to diverge within the state, as a counterpoint to Hegel's argument that the state mediated and united the particularities of individual competition amongst the propertied members of civil society represented in the state.[34] However, after the introduction of the excluded class of concrete labour (the proletariat), the universality of the state is increasingly presented in terms of the (implicit) class interest of civil society (in the restricted sense of the bourgeoisie) in protecting and perpetuating the system of private property that sustains their position, privileges and property against the threat of its excluded foundation, that is to say, the proletariat. Here, it is relevant to recall that Hegel identified the modern state's universality with its explication and protection of the subjective freedom of civil society conceived in terms of private property (Hegel 1991b, 73–78, 239, 276 (§§ 41-46, 208, 258)). Marx concurred regarding the modern state's function but argued that this exposed it's supposed universality as concealing the particular class interest of the bourgeoisie and, as such, fundamentally illusory (Marx 1975b, 166, 176–7 (108, 116-8); Marx 1975d, 256–257 (181-183)).[35]

The modern state and the legal system protects and perpetuates the system of private property. In order to do this, it relies on the differentiated participation and obedience of society in its entirety, not just its propertied members (e.g. Marx 1975b, 184 (124)). This is legitimized by the appearance of a separation between the private economic interests within civil society and the supposed universality of the state codified in and by political theological doctrines. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* perpetuated this doctrine and/as the illusory abstraction of the state from the particularities and contradictions of civil society and this was precisely what Marx sought to challenge by insisting on their fundamental continuity: the competition and class conflict within civil society created and legitimized the appearance and function of the state as sovereign subject, supposedly transcending and mediating these contradictions, but which actually formed an integral part of them, protecting and perpetuating the very system of private property that generated it. The supposedly sovereign state is the illusion of the overcoming of the inherent contradictions of civil society that creates and perpetuates it. In this sense, the nature of the state is the state of nature (Marx 1975b, 164, 167-8, 174–5 (105-6, 108-11, 114-5); see also Flohr 2021, 560).

Towards the end of Marx's unfinished *Critique*, private property increasingly comes to the fore and figures as the real organizing principle behind the modern state. The system of private property mediates access to the necessities of life through the individualizing competition of the market, which divides individuals against one another in the pursuit of their private (individual) interests as private property. Moreover, the possession of private property determines an individual's position and possibilities within this system, dividing individuals against each other as individuals and in structurally opposed classes, reducing them to a 'property of property,' i.e. to objects of social and economic relations that seemingly transcend and determine them from outside (Marx 1975b, 175, 149 (116, 91-2)).[36] Much in the same way that the state appears and functions. Marx identifies private property as both a form of 'religion' and an 'alienation' like the state, that is, as an objectification and alienation and thus also as a logical predicate of civil society – although it, similarly, appears and operates as if it was in fact the subject (Marx 1975b, 171, 169, 180 (112, 110-1, 120)).

The point of Marx's inversion of the relationship between the state and private property in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is to reveal the limits of Hegel's assertion that the state

overcomes and mediates the contradictions and conflict within civil society occasioned by the system of private property, and to expose their structural entwinement, as he insists: 'The constitution is the constitution of private property' (Marx 1975b, 177 (118); see also 166 (108)). Marx uses 'constitution' here in the Hegelian sense of the structure and organization of the state in its entirety. His point is that the modern, supposedly sovereign state arises from the contradictions and conflicts of (the system of) private property and does not transcend them but partakes in and perpetuates them. The state and the legal system protects the possessions, power and privilege of the propertied classes against those excluded from it.

But the modern state does not only arise from the contradictions of the system of private property, it also plays a fundamental role in generating them. The mere fact of possession is not the same as private property nor a system of private property. Possession cannot sustain itself on its own but requires the constitution, codification, regulation and protection of it as private property by the modern state and the legal system. The state, in other words, constitutes the very same system of property relations that produce the individualizing competition and class conflict that in turn constitute it, forming a self-perpetuating and – legitimizing whole. The modern state and private property, in other words, form distinct but structurally integrated parts of the same self-perpetuating system of social and political alienation.

Private property is a legal category of ownership that exists in and as a social and political relation, which is maintained and perpetuated through the illusory transcendence and absolute power attributed to the modern state in political theological doctrine, supported by the underlying dynamics of civil society. As such, the modern state is both the maker and guarantor of the system of private property *and* an effect or expression of it.[37] The sovereign state and private property are contemporaneous and mutually supportive elements of the same system of social and political alienation that are maintained by their apparent separation *qua* political theology. According to Marx, it is only the simultaneous abolition of the state and private property that can overcome society's alienation from itself and attain its collective and practical agency, constituting it as universal, self-determining subject in and as 'true democracy' (Marx 1975b, 88 (32); see also Flohr 2021, 560–1).[38]

To summarize, it is the collective agency of society that makes the state through its collective participation and obedience. Society here refers to the historically determinate form of civil society, that is, capitalism, an economic system organized around the production, exchange and accumulation of private property. This historical form divides society along a horizontal and vertical axis, that is, as individuals opposed to each other in economic competition and as antagonistic classes based on private property or lack thereof. These divisions within society also prevent it from recognizing its (alienated) collective agency in the seemingly sovereign state, which appears as a separate (transcendent) and absolute power over its members.

The contradictions and especially the class conflict within civil society threaten to potentially undermine its continued functioning as an economic system based on private property and therefore necessitates (and legitimates) the sovereign power of the state as an external mediator and guarantor of this system against its inherent contradictions. While the state may succeed in mediating the antagonistic competition amongst the propertied classes, it cannot resolve the contradiction between them and

the property-less proletariat, whose impoverishment and work constitutes the foundation of the entire system and its wealth. It is therefore restricted to repressing their discontent and protecting existing property relations *qua* class relations. The state cannot resolve, but merely sustain and manage the class contradictions of civil society, which continuously reproduce the need for as well as the appearance and function of the state as a seemingly sovereign subject transcending and mediating the contradictions of civil society (political theology). However, when looking at civil society from this perspective, it is clear that the state forms a necessary part of this system. The state is not autonomous from civil society but is a structurally integrated and necessary part of civil society, which in turn sustains it. The state must thus be conceived as a formally and institutionally distinct part of civil society that is nonetheless structurally integrated and necessary to this totality; both sustaining and being sustained by it in a reciprocal relationship that perpetuates society's social and political alienation from its own potential universality and collective agency.

5. Conclusion

Hegel's summation of the predominant tradition of political theology presented the sovereign state as a sovereign subject that transcended and determined society. Marx's reformatory critique of Hegel's political theology, on the other hand, showed that the state neither transcends nor exercises absolute power over society; rather, it is the collective but differentiated participation and obedience of the members of civil society that constitutes the state. However, the inherent competition and class conflict over private property in civil society divides its members from one another and leaves them incapable of recognizing their collective agency in and as the basis of the state. As a result, the state appears as a transcendent and sovereign subject, and, to the extent the members of society accept and act in accordance with this appearance, participating in and subordinating themselves to the institutions of the seemingly sovereign state, they end up conferring a social and material reality on it, that allows it to continue to function as if it actually was a transcendent and sovereign subject. Marx's reformatory critique thereby sublated Hegel's political theology, inscribing and interpreting its account of state sovereignty within a materialist perspective that explained its appearance and efficacy in terms of the social and material contradictions that animate and sustain the functional fiction of the sovereign state.

The sovereign state is not as it appears to be, separate from society, but a separation within society; it is an *alienation* of society in two closely entwined regards: it is the alienation of society from its own collective agency that is objectified in and as the state, which is in turn premised on the competition and class conflict over private property within civil society, which alienates its members from one another. This system of private property requires and legitimizes the sovereign state as an external guarantor and mediator of these contradictions. However, rather than overcoming the contradictions of civil society, the state forms a fundamental and structurally integrated part of them insofar as it constitutes and enforces the very legal system and property relations that produces and reproduces the competition and class contradiction within civil society, which in turn underpin and sustain the seemingly sovereign state, constituting separate but structurally integrated and mutually dependent parts within a single self-perpetuating and –

sustaining (alienated) whole, that is the capitalist system, which Marx would proceed to analyse in much more detail in his subsequent works, starting from his incomplete reflections posthumously published as *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* all the way up to his magnum opus *Capital*.

Notes

1. Two different versions of these manuscripts edited variously by the former Russian revolutionary and director of the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow David Ryazanov and the two German Social Democrats Siegfried Landshut and Jacob Peter Mayer appeared in 1932 (Ryazanov had already published fragments in 1927). The presentation of them as a coherent series of manuscript has subsequently been challenged (Musto 2015, 233–237; Rojahn 1983; 1985).
2. György Lukács' prescient 1923 analysis of commodity fetishism in *Capital* as a form of 'reification' [*Verdinglichung*, *Versachlichung*] anticipated the focus on alienation that followed in the wake of the publication of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (Lukács 1971, 83–222; see also Musto 2021, 4–5).
3. Note that Marx does not actually use the term 'capitalism' in these texts but relies on Hegel's innovative use of the term 'civil society' [*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*], which he was the first to (re-)conceptualize as distinct sphere of social and economic activity separate from the state (Hegel 1991b, 220–1, 276 (§§ 182A, 258); Riedel 1984, 129–158).
4. Contrary to oft-repeated claims that Marx never developed a theory of politics and the state (e.g., Anderson 1976, 4, 11; Colletti 1972, 185; Kesselman 1982, 82; Milliband 1977, 1–2; Avineri 1968, 42).
5. The vast literature on Marx's concept of alienation focuses primarily on the Hegelian usage of the concept at the expense of this prior use in political philosophy. Amongst the few attentive authors that have noted it as part of a general etymology of the concept, none have examined Marx's use of it in *Critique* (Lukács 1975, 538; Mézsaros, 1970: 52; Petrović 2001, 11–12; Schacht 2015, 8–13; Osborne 2005, 49–50; Sayers 2011: ix).
6. My argument thus diverges from Louis Althusser's claim that there was a single rupture between Marx's 'early' works and his 'mature' critique of political economy (Althusser 2005: xi-xxii, xxxii-xxxv) without denying (substantial) developments in his thought. This is supported by Marx's own account of his intellectual trajectory, which identifies 'the general conclusion' to his 'critical re-examination of the Hegelian philosophy of law' and other writings from the early 1840s as 'the guiding thread' of his subsequent critique of political economy (1987, 262–3). This suggests that while Marx's use of the concept(s) of 'alienation' might have changed in *Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts* and declined somewhat in frequency in his subsequent critique of political economy, the insights that it helped articulate did not, even if they developed a lot in other regards (Marx 1975e; Livingstone 1975, 430; Musto 2021, 28–44; Comninel 2019, 10–7, 23-5).
7. I use the term 'sublation' [*Aufhebung*] in the Hegelian sense, to denote a determinate negation, i.e., a process that involves the simultaneous cancellation, preservation and elevation or expansion of a particular perspective in the process of confronting and overcoming its contradictions in order to formulate a new and more inclusive one (see Hegel 1969, 81–82 (21.94-21.96R); 1991a: 154 (§ 96A)).
8. To ease cross-referencing all references to Marx's *Critique* (1975b, 57–198) and 'Introduction' (Marx 1975d, 243–258) will be followed by a parenthesis containing the corresponding page number(s) in the authoritative German *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*^{2} (Marx 1982a, 3–137; 1982b: 170-183). I have updated the translations where relevant.
9. While Marx asserted that Prussia and Germany more generally was particularly politically and economically backwards in relation to other European states in the 'Introduction,' he simultaneously also insisted that its backwardness and contradictions belonged to the paradigm of the modern state – and that their concomitant political theories (primarily Hegel's

Philosophy of Right) nonetheless constituted the most advanced theoretical representations of the modern state (Marx 1975b, 252–3, 247–8 (177-9, 173-4); *pace* Leopold 2007, 56–7).

10. The concept of species-being seems to have originated in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* (1991a, 293–4 (§§ 221-2)), where a similar concept of the human species [*Gattung*] is employed to denote the 'natural' component of human life as opposed to its spiritual dimensions, which fits well with Feuerbach's consistent counterposing of nature (or humanity's natural existence) and theology (which would later come to include Hegel's own philosophy). While Marx also used the term, its meaning was fundamentally altered by his implicit materialist critique of Feuerbach as I will show in the following (see also Kouvelakis 2003, 305–308).
11. A similar motif figures in a passage in *Phenomenology of Spirit* shortly before the transition to self-consciousness, which has clear parallels to Feuerbach's critique of religion. In this passage consciousness confronts the idea of an inverted world [*verkehrte Welt*] transcending the sensible world, which it is unable to overcome until it (re-)turns to itself as the origin of this division (Hegel 1977, 97; see also 1969, 449 (11.353)).
12. It should be noted that Rosen (1977, 202–205) has argued that 'the method of conversion' can also be traced further back to the works of Bruno Bauer. While Bauer was one of the first to formulate a Hegelian 'humanist' critique of religion and exercised a significant influence on the Young Hegelians (especially Marx during the writing of his thesis, but see also Kangal 2020; Marx 1975c), it is Feuerbach's formalization of this argument and method in terms of the inversion of subject and predicate, especially his application of it to Hegel's philosophy as a form of theology, which constitutes the most obvious and central influence on Marx's *Critique*.
13. Note that this English translation, and a number of the others I quote from, translate the German *Mensch* as 'man.' This is an outdated and unnecessarily gendered translation. It is more adequately translated as human, (the) human being, humanity or humankind. I have consulted the original German texts and updated translations accordingly throughout.
14. This also implies that the critique of religion must assume the material form of a practical inversion of the world of humankind, that is, a revolution (Marx 1975d, 251 (177)).
15. Following the terminology of his source material, i.e., Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, Marx primarily speaks of 'civil society' in *Critique*, which is mainly used to denote modern capitalist society as a whole, but occasionally also to designate the propertied classes of bourgeoisie society excluding the proletariat. I return to examine this duality in more detail in the final section.
16. This marks a significant development in relation to the other Young Hegelians who continued to identify the modern state as the logical and historical subject that would actualize reason and freedom (over and against religion) inspired by their particular reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (e.g., Feuerbach 2012a, 150; Feuerbach 2012b, 172; Bauer 1840; Ruge 1983; see also Hegel 1991b).
17. The (political) economic connotations of exchanging or otherwise transferring property remain evident in the contemporary use of *Entaüsserung* and are even more pronounced in *Veräusserung*, which Hegel likewise employed in this sense in his analysis of the exchange of private property in *Philosophy of Right*. *Entfremdung* historically also had connotations of forced transfer or expropriation (i.e. alienation) of property i.e. 'to rob, to take, to strip of' (see Schacht 2015, 5; Hegel 1991b, 95–102 (§§ 65-70)). Moreover, Richard Schacht (2015, 35–6) notes that it is possible to trace the political philosophical connotations of alienation in Hegel's description of finite consciousness' ethical formation and reconciliation with the rationality of the state, which leads it to willingly forsake its particularity in the universality of the state (closely paralleling Rousseau).
18. István Mészáros likewise emphasizes the central use of various terms related to alienation in Judeo-Christian theology but identifies it primarily with the separation of humanity from God (Mészáros 1970, 28–33).
19. It is perhaps also instructive to note that 'object' [*Gegenstand*] in Hegel's Swabian dialect at this point in time also carried connotations of 'impediment, opposition, obstacle, resistance' that had disappeared in High German (Petry 1970, 163–4).

20. Malabou (2005, 111–2) highlights that Hegel in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977, 492–3) conceived the reconciliation of subject and substance in terms of the conceptual inversion of *Entäusserung*, i.e., *Erinnerung* denoting memory/recollection (of the unity of subject and substance, which was in a sense always already the case) and can also be read as *Er-inner-ung*, that is, 'making inner' or interiorizing substance in and as the subject (see also Rotenstreich 1965: 144-161; Lukács 1975: 546-547).
21. Marx's description of this collective subjectivity as 'spirit' [*Geist*] in this passage appears to be a deliberate illustration of the effect of his inversion and sublation of Hegel's political philosophy, which reveals the mundane basis of Hegel's (political) theological abstraction of spirit, rendering it immanent to the social and material whole *qua* (civil) society.
22. The fact that Marx foregoes the much more common German term *Untertan* in favour of *Staatssubjekt* attests to this being a deliberate wordplay intended to communicate a genuine analytical point regarding the constitution of social and political power in modern (capitalist) societies. Note, that these two concepts of 'subject' are etymologically distinct, deriving from *subditus* and *subjectum* respectively (Flohr 2021, 570n75; see also Osborne et al. 2006).
23. I use the rather inelegant term 'subjectness' here to avoid confusion with the common philosophical deployment of 'subjectivity' to denote individual finite consciousness. For all the differences between Hegel's and Marx's conception of the logical and historical subject (e.g., the difference between a transcendent pseudo-theological figure and the social and material totality of a given society) neither is reducible to an individual 'subjectivity' as consciousness.
24. Many of the thinkers within this tradition simultaneously formed part of the political theological tradition insofar as they formulated doctrines of state sovereignty. When I describe them as part of the natural law tradition here, it is to emphasize their common insistence on a pseudo-mythological originary liberty as the popular origin of sovereign power (against previous doctrines of divine right) in contrast to Hegel's insistence on the sovereign state being logically prior to the people, actualizing itself in and of them and only thereby achieving freedom.
25. Grotius' natural law argument explicitly did not rely on God or theology, unlike the arguments of most earlier thinkers within this tradition (see Grotius 2005, 89).
26. Rousseau cities and criticizes Grotius without reference in the passage in question (Rousseau 1987, 144; Grotius 2005, 260–1). It is his own (rather problematic) identification of the two parties to the social contract that allows him to claim that this 'total alienation' does not entail a loss of freedom, unlike with his predecessors (Rousseau 1987, 148; Althusser 2007, 126–138).
27. It should be noted that there is no indication of any teleological momentum to Marx's argument. It is merely a social and material analysis that suggests society's capacity for collective self-determination. There is no trace of any metaphysical guarantees that this will necessarily be achieved.
28. This also applies to Feuerbach's critique of religion. See section one.
29. This would also assume an objective form but would not necessarily be alienated insofar as it would no longer be separated from its subjective foundation.
30. Note that this is solely a potential identified by Marx, its achievement is neither presupposed nor guaranteed. Marx's adaptation of the Hegelian motif of alienation does not imply any sort of teleology. It takes the form of a historical, but fundamentally *open* dialectic.
31. This holds in spite of Feuerbach's rather strange and somewhat misleading designation of his philosophy as 'anthropotheism,' even though he insisted that it had moved beyond the transcendence of theology and, as such, could be described more precisely as atheism. This strange self-designation should instead be conceived as an efficient illustration of the inconsistency of his materialism and his concomitant failure to break free from theology, which Marx challenged and overcame.
32. Marx refers numerous times in the manuscript to a section on civil society that was never completed. Arguably this unrealized section instead became the focus of the rest of his life's work, as he suggested in the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*,

where he explained that 'the anatomy of this civil society […] has to be sought in political economy' (1987, 262).

33. Marx does not in fact use the modern concept of class [*Klasse*] to refer to this class in *Critique* but the traditional Estate [*Stand*], seemingly to mock Hegel's medieval 'resolution' to the distinctly modern and capitalist problems of civil society (Hegel himself had also foregone the use of estate in regard to this particular class, given their distinct lack of status [*Stand*]). However, in 'Introduction,' Marx deploys class [*Klasse*] consistently to describe both this and other modern classes (Marx 1982b, 179–181; see also Avineri 1968, 26n1).
34. I say 'within the state' since the state structure outlined by Hegel that Marx was commenting on was dominated by members of the propertied classes: property qualification ensured that the representatives that sat within the estates assembly came from the propertied classes and although civil servants were recruited on a meritocratic basis from all walks of life, they were provided with entailed estates and a guaranteed income and thus integrated into the propertied classes. According to Hegel, this ensured their 'impartiality' and the alignment of their private interests and the perpetuation of the system of private property, that is, the state's illusory universality. It is important to note that while this particular historical class composition of the political state may have eased the reproduction of the structural integration of the state in the system of private property, it was not a structural precondition of it. It did, however, serve as an efficient illustration of this integration at the time that Marx was writing.
35. This of course does not mean that the particularities of civil society in the restricted sense are entirely mediated by the state as Marx highlights throughout the manuscript; rather they seem to persist in and as various forms of institutionalized politics. Moreover, it is also important to highlight that the state is not simply the instrument of the propertied members of civil society. They do not exist independently of the state's constitution and maintenance of the property relations that constitute and maintain them as a distinct class with particular interests within the system of private property. Moreover, the (partial) convergence of their private interests in the state's perpetuation of the system of private property requires the mediation of the state's institutions. The modern state's structural integration in the capitalist system should thus be conceived historical and structural rather than instrumental.
36. Marx pronouncement that 'the will becomes the property of property' (Marx 1975b, 175 (116) – against Hegel's argument that property was the actualization of the (free) will – in many ways aligns with his 'mature' analysis of commodity fetishism in *Capital*, which similarly makes 'a definite social relation between humans' assume 'the fantastic form of a relation between things,' or, more precisely, commodities, which he insisted '[abound] in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.' These parallels imply that it might be possible to reread his mature critique of political economy (and the conceptualization of capital as 'an automatic subject') on the model of *Critique* as a reformatory critique of economic theology (Marx 1976, 165, 163, 225; see also Colletti 1975, 37–41; Avineri 1968, 30; Karatani 2005, 212ff; 2016; Callinicos 2014, 211–233; *pace* Postone 1993, 75ff).
37. Note that this is an analysis of the established capitalist system's self-perpetuating dynamics rather than its historical emergence and is, as such, not a circular account.
38. Crucially, this self-determination should not be conceptualized on the model of (popular) sovereignty as I have already shown. Sovereignty refers to the political theological separation of society from its collective agency, i.e., the very alienation that Marx's *Critique* is directed against and aims to facilitate the abolishment of.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the late professor Nigel Dodd for encouraging me to pursue this subject many years ago and acknowledge the insightful comments on previous versions of this article by Yancé

Myah Harrison, Mathias Hein Jessen, Nicolai von Eggers, Allan Dreyer Hansen, Søren Mau and the two anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Mikkel Flohr is postdoctoral research fellow at Roskilde University. His research and teaching take place at the intersection of social and political theory, philosophy and the history of ideas. He has previously worked on questions of sovereignty, democracy and has just commenced a research project on emergency politics funded by the Carlsberg Foundation. His research has been published in *Distinktion*, *Theory and Event*, *Telos*, *Parrhesia*, *Contemporary Political Theory* and more.

ORCID

Mikkel Flohr http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6465-9870

References

Abensour, Miguel. 2011. *Democracy against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Anderson, Perry. 1976. *Considerations on Western Marxism*. London: New Left Books.
Aristotle. 1952. *Metaphysics*. United States of America: University of Michigan Press.
Althusser, Louis. 2003. *The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings*. London: Verso.
Althusser, Louis. 2005 [1965]. *For Marx*. London: Verso.
Althusser, Louis. 2007. *Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx*. London: Verso.
Arthur, Christopher. 1987. *Dialectics of Labour: Marx and his Relation to Hegel*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Avineri, Shlomo. 1968. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bauer, Bruno. 1840. *Die evangelische Landeskirche Preussens und die Wissenschaft*. Leipzig: Otto Wigand.
Bauer, Bruno (published anonymously). 1989 [1841]. *The Trumpet of the Last Judgment against Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist. An Ultimatum*. Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press.
Breckman, Warren. 1999. *Marx, The Young Hegelians and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, Wendy. 2014. *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*. New York, NY: Zone Books.
Callinicos, Alex. 2014. *Deciphering Capital: Marx's Capital and its Destiny*. London: Bookmarks.
Colletti, Lucio. 1972. *From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society*. London: Monthly Review Press.
Colletti, Lucio. 1975. Introduction. In *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, 7–56. London: Penguin.
Comninel, George. 2019. *Alienation and Emancipation in the Work of Karl Marx*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Durkheim, Emile. 2002 [1897]. *Suicide: A Sociological Study*. London: Routledge.
Durkheim, Emile. 2013 [1893]. *The Division of Labour in Society*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Elshtain, Jean. 2008. *Sovereignty: God, State and Self*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Feuerbach, Ludwig (anonymously published). 1981 [1830]. *Thoughts on Death and Immortality: From the Papers of a Thinker, along with an Appendix of Theological Satirical Epigrams, Edited by One of his Friends*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Feuerbach, Ludwig. 2008 [1841; 2nd ed. 1843]. *The Essence of Christianity*. Walnut, CA: MSAC Philosophy Group. Retrieved online [http://www.lulu.com/items/volume_63/2850000/2850989/3/print/essence8.pdf] 02/06/2012.
Feuerbach, Ludwig. 2012a [Unknown]. The Necessity of a Reform of Philosophy. In *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings*, ed. Zawar Hanfi, 145–52. London: Verso.
Feuerbach, Ludwig. 2012b [1843]. Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy. In *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings*, ed. Zawar Hanfi, 153–74. London: Verso.
Feuerbach, Ludwig. 2012c [1843]. Principles of the Philosophy of the Future. In *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings*, ed. Zawar Hanfi, 175–246. London: Verso.
Flohr, Mikkel. 2021. From the Critique of the Heavens to the Critique of the Earth: A Contribution to the Reconstruction of Karl Marx's Unfinished Critique of Political Theology. *Theory and Event* 24, no. 2: 537–71.
Fromm, Erich. 1961. *Marx's Concept of Man*. London: Continuum.
Grotius, Hugo. 2005 [1625]. *The Rights of War and Peace (3 volumes)*. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
Grotius, Hugo. 2006 [Written 1604]. *Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty*. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1969 [1812; 2nd ed. 1831]. *Science of Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1977 [1807]. *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1991a [1817]. *The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1991b [1821]. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1994 [1651; Latin ed. 1668]. *Leviathan with Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Hudson, Wayne. 2008. Fables of Sovereignty. In *Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia?*, eds. Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford, and Ramesh Thakur, 19–32. England: Ashgate.
Kangal, Kaan. 2020. "Marx's 'Bonn Notebooks' in Context: Reconsidering the Relationship between Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx between 1839 and 1842. *Historical Materialism* 28, no. 4: 102–38.
Kantorowicz, Ernst. 1997 [1957]. *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Karatani, Kojin. 2005. *Transcritique: On Kant and Marx*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Karatani, Kojin. 2016. Capital as Spirit. *Crisis and Critique* 3, no. 3: 166–89.
Kesselman, Mark. 1982. The State and Class Struggle: Trends in Marxist Political Science. In *The Left Academy: Marxist Scholarship on American Campuses*, eds. Bertel Ollman, and Edward Vernoff, 82–114. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Kouvelakis, Stathis. 2003. *Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx*. London: Verso.
Leopold, David. 2007. *The Young Karl Marx: German Philosophy, Modern Politics and Human Flourishing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Livingstone, Rodney. 1975. Glossary of Key Terms. In *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, 429–32. London: Penguin.
Lukács, György. 1971 [1923]. *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lukács, György. 1975 [1948]. *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relation Between Dialectics and Economics*. London: Merlin Press.
Macpherson, Crawford. 2011 [1962]. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Malabou, Catherine. 2005 [1995]. *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Marcuse, Herbert. 1967 [1941]. *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. London: Routledge.

Marx, Karl. 1975a [1839]. Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. In *Karl Marx & Frederick Engels Collected Works. Volume 1: Marx: 1835-1843*, eds. Natalia Karmanova, Margarita Lopukhina, Victor Schnittke, Lyudgarda Zubrilova, Natina Perova, and Vladimir Mosolov, 25–105. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Marx, Karl. 1975b [Written 1843]. Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of State. In *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, 57–198. London: Penguin.
Marx, Karl. 1975c [1844]. On the Jewish Question. In *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, 211–42. London: Penguin.
Marx, Karl. 1975d [1844]. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. Introduction. In *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, 243–58. London: Penguin.
Marx, Karl. 1975e [Written 1844]. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. In *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, 279–400. London: Penguin.
Marx, Karl. 1976. [1867]. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One*. England: Penguin.
Marx, Karl. 1981 [Written 1843]. Notizen zur Geschichte Frankreichs, Deutschlands, Englands und Schwedens (Historisch-politische Hefte 4). In *Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe IV.2: Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels: Exzerpte und Notizen. 1843 bis Januar 1845*, eds. Nelly Rumjanzewa, Bernhard Dohm, Swetlana Nasarowa, Eleonora Safronowa, Ljudmila Welitschanskaja, Olga Chorewa, and Natalja Dudina, 145–221. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
Marx, Karl. 1982a [Written 1843]. Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. In *Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe I.2: Karl Marx: Werke, Artikel, Entwürfe, März 1843 bis August 1844*, eds. Inge Taubert, Deana Bauer, Bernhard Dohm, Johanna Dehnert, Christa Krause, and Rosemarie Lüdemann, 3–137. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
Marx, Karl. 1982b [1844]. Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung. In *Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe I.2: Karl Marx: Werke, Artikel, Entwürfe, März 1843 bis August 1844*, eds. Inge Taubert, Deana Bauer, Bernhard Dohm, Johanna Dehnert, Christa Krause, and Rosemarie Lüdemann, 170–83. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
Marx, Karl. 1987. *The Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Volume 29: Economic Works 1857-1861*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
McLellan, David. 1971. *The Thought of Karl Marx*. New York, NY: Harper and Row.
Mészáros, István. 1970. *Marx's Theory of Alienation*. London: Merlin Press.
Milliband, Ralph. 1977. *Marxism and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Musto, Marcello. 2015. The Myth of the 'Young Marx' in the Interpretations of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of* 1844. *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 43, no. 2: 233–60.
Musto, Marcello. 2021. Alienation Redux: Marxian Perspectives. In *Karl Marx's Writings on Alienation*, 3–48. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ollman, Bertell. 1971. *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Osborne, Peter. 2005. *How to Read Marx*. London: Granta Books.
Osborne, Peter, Étienne Balibar, Barbara Cassin and Alain de Libera. 2006. Vocabularies of the European Philosophies, Part 1: Subject. *Radical Philosophy* 138: 15–41.
Petrović, Gajo. 2001. Alienation. In *Dictionary of Marxist Thought (2nd ed.)*, ed. Tom Bottomore, 11–26. Oxford: Blackwell.
Petry, Michael. 1970. Introduction. In G.W.F. *Hegel. Philosophy of Nature*, Volume One, 11–177. London: Allen and Unwin.
Postone, Moishe. 1993. *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Riedel, Manfred. 1984. *Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rojahn, Jürgen. 1983. Marxismus-Marx-Geschichtswissenschaft-1844. *International Review of Social History* 28: 2–49.
Rojahn, Jürgen. 1985. Die Marxschen Manuscript aus dem Jahre 1844 in der Neuen Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe. *Archive für Sozialgeschichte* 25: 647–63.
Rosen, Zvi. 1977. *Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx: The Influence of Bruno Bauer on Marx's Thought*. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Rotenstreich, Nathan. 1965. *Basic Problems of Marx's Philosophy*. Indianapolis; IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1987 [1762]. On the Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right. In *Basic Political Writings*, ed. Donald Cress, 141–227. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Ruge, Arnold. 1982 [1842). Hegel's Philosophy of Right and the Politics of our Times. In *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology*, ed. Lawrence Stepelevich, 211–36. New Jersey, NJ: Humanities Press.
Sayers, Sean. 2011. *Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schacht, Richard. 2015 [1970]. *Alienation*. London: Psychology Press.
Schmitt, Carl. 2006 [1922]. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Weber, Max. 1992 [1905; 2nd ed. 1920]. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London: Routledge.
Weber, Max. 2004 [1917]. Science as a Vocation. In *The Vocation Lectures*, eds. David Owen and Tracy Strong, 1–31. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.